SPS measures are defined by the World Trade Organization as follows: ”Any measure applied: As part of the government`s formal notice to Congress in March 2013 launching trade negotiations between the United States and the EU, the USTR stated that one of its specific objectives in the TTIP negotiation is to `remove or reduce non-tariff barriers to trade, that reduce trade opportunities for US exports, provide a competitive advantage to EU products or otherwise distort trade”, such as SPS measures ”not based on scientific evidence”, as well as TBT measures ”unjustified” and ”other cross-border barriers”, including restrictive management of tariff quotas and barriers to licensing and licensing that result in unnecessary costs and limit the potential for competition for U.S. exports. 48 The USTR subsequently found that differences in US and EU approaches to regulation and standardisation had led to ”unnecessary barriers that increase costs, discourage trade and investment, and negatively impact our competitiveness and consumers”,and called on EU regulators to adopt a US rule-making process based on transparency, Participation and accountability.49 Within the WTO, a Special Committee as a forum for the exchange of information between the governments of member States on all aspects related to the implementation of the SPS Agreement. The SPS Committee verifies compliance with the agreement, discusses issues with potential trade implications and maintains close cooperation with relevant technical organisations. In the event of a trade dispute concerning a sanitary or phytosanitary measure, the usual WTO dispute settlement procedures will be applied and the advice of appropriate scientific experts may be sought. The U.S. restricts imports of fresh potatoes from certain states to make potato chips and limits deliveries to a single hacker over a specific shipping period of just five months (February to June) due to phytosanitary concerns. The United States supports SPS measures taken by governments to protect their populations, animals, and plants from health risks. Unfortunately, governments often try to disguise discriminatory measures, whether too burdensome or not based on scientific evidence, as legitimate SPS measures. These measures create significant barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, and the USTR is working to identify and remove these barriers.
Of the product groups examined in the report, SPS and TBT measures applied to US poultry exports to the EU reduced trade by the highest percentage. Their impact has been estimated at the equivalent of a 102 per cent tariff. Other US exports to the EU also appear to be strongly affected by the SPS and TBT measures. The restrictive impact of various NCDs applied to U.S. exports of pork, corn, fruit and vegetables was equivalent to a tariff of 35 to 81 percent. In addition, the tariff equivalent of the SPS and TBT measures on US beef and soybean exports to the EU was estimated at 23% and 17%, respectively. With the exception of beef, the tariff equivalents of the SPS and TBT measures for all product groups covered by the study were much higher than the duties currently levied on US exports to the EU. High percentage estimates of tariff equivalent may have a low impact in dollar terms if trade in the affected sector is not significant, while the reverse is true for estimates of low tariff equivalents in major trade sectors. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) identifies most spastic measures to include:12 Since NAFTA came into force in 1994, the United States has successfully negotiated several free trade agreements (with Jordon, Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Bahrain, Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea; see Table 1). Each of these free trade agreements deals in one way or another with SPS and TBT issues. However, compared to NAFTA, subsequent free trade agreements do not deal as broadly with SPS and TBT issues, nor with SPS or TBT-specific disputes or issues. Instead, subsequent free trade agreements generally focus on each party`s rights and obligations under the WTO SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement, and some FTAs establish standing committees to advise and resolve issues on an ongoing basis.25 These FTAs also do not establish dispute settlement procedures to resolve disputes related to SPS and TBT measures.
==References=====External links===Negotiators used the negotiation meetings that resulted in an agreement or the subsequent ratification and implementation period to address and resolve some outstanding issues. While not all trade concerns regarding the application of SPS and TBT measures are the subject of a formal complaint to the WTO, some trade concerns related to SPS/TBT measures may develop into a formal trade dispute that, in some cases, requires dispute settlement between the United States and its trading partners within the WTO. Dr-CAFTA reaffirms the rights and obligations of all parties under the WTO SPS Agreement, establishes a Standing SPS Committee as contained in the Chile-Australia Agreements, but further clarifies which bodies should be represented in each country. Sub-agreements with Costa Rica and El Salvador agree to cooperate with the United States in scientific and technical work to ensure market access for poultry. ==References=====External links===A cover letter with DR states that the RD ”cannot issue or refuse import permits based on SPS concerns, national purchasing requirements or discretionary criteria. [DR] applies all SPS measures it imposes separately from its system of import licences. Despite an importing country`s stated policy objectives for the introduction of non-tariff measures such as SPS and TBT measures – namely to protect public health and the environment – the WTO recognizes that such measures often serve deliberate protectionist purposes and could cause economic losses to some exporting countries.121 However, it is not always easy to quantify the potential economic losses resulting from non-tariff measures. Tariff. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures can naturally lead to trade restrictions. All governments accept that certain trade restrictions may be necessary to ensure food safety and the protection of animal and plant health. However, governments are sometimes under pressure to go beyond what is necessary to protect health and apply sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions to protect domestic producers from economic competition.
This pressure is likely to increase as other trade barriers are removed as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements. A sanitary or phytosanitary restriction that is not really necessary for health reasons can be a very effective protectionist means and, because of its technical complexity, a particularly misleading and difficult obstacle to combat. Notes: Similar data are not available for TBT measures and would probably also cover non-food products. An important point in the TPP negotiations on agricultural products is the question of how to address SPS issues. In a May 2012 white paper, the American Meat Institute and the National Chicken Council called for the inclusion of an ”SPS Chapter `WTO Plus`, an agreement that strengthens and strengthens the rules and disciplines of the WTO SPS Agreement” and stresses the importance of science-based regulation. 29 The May 2012 White Paper contains several recommendations aimed at addressing concerns such as `unnecessary trade-restrictive measures that are not scientifically based` and new measures that `do not comply with scientifically sound international standards` or that are based on the application of `dubious test methods to enforce standards`. It recommends that the TPP strengthen risk assessment and management requirements; strengthen the WTO rule requiring regulators to select available risk management options that least restrict trade; promote trade improvement measures such as equivalence, recognition of control systems and harmonisation of export licences; require parties to provide for a reasonable grace period before implementing new non-urgent measures; improving transparency; and strengthening the role of science-based international standards and promoting harmonization of standards, among other recommendations. .
